Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1979

Carl H. Powell v. S. Tony Cox, Director, Drivers
License Division, Department of Public Safety For
the State of Utah : Respondent's Brief on Appeal
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Bruce M. Hale; Attorney for RespondentRobert M. McRae;
Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Powell v. Cox, No. 16660 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1953

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

,.

'

IN THE SUPREME·COUl\'.l"
OF THE STATE OF

* * * * * * * • •• .
CARL H. POWELL,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs

s. TONY cox, Director,
Driver License Division,
Utah Dept. of Public Safety,
Defendant/Resi;>ondent~

* •

* •

* ••

,,
.IOBERT M. McRAE
McRAE & DeLAND
Utah
Attorneys for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

5

POINT I
THE PEACE OFFICER DETERMINES HOW A
BREATHALYZER IS TO BE ADMINISTERED
AND IF A BREATH SAMPLE IS ADEQUATE

5

POINT II
THE APPELLANT'S REFUSAL TO FOLLOW
THE OFFICER'S INSTRUCTION WAS A
REFUSAL

8

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF A
REFUSAL IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE AND SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED
CONCLUSION

..... .... ...

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-i-

10
11

AUTHORITIES AND CASES CITED
Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d, 1335 (1979)

7, 9 ,10

Cahall v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 94 Cal. Rptr. 182
(Cal. App. -1971). . • . . ; •

.

Charleton v. Hackett, 360 P. 2d., 176 (1961)

10,11

10

Devas v. Noble, 369 P.2d., 290 (1962)

11

Elliott v. Darius, 557 P.2d. 759

(1976).

10

Gassman v. Darius, 557 P.2d., 197 (1975)

10

Moran v. Shaw, 580 P.2d., 241 (1978)

•.

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, § 41-6-44.10

. . . 5,6

SECONDARY SOURCES
Richard E. Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases, 3rd
Edition., Vol. 2 (1979) •
• •• · . · • · · • • • • 9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-ii-

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CARL

H. POWELL,
Plaintiff/Appellant.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
ON APPEAL

vs

s. TONY COX, Director,
Driver License Division,
Utah Dept. of Public Safety,

Case No. 16660

Defendant/Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This proceeding involves a claim by appellant that the
revocation of his driving privileges for refusing to submit to
a chemical test is erroneous.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable J. Robert Bullock found that appellant had
not submitted to a breathalyzer test as requested by the arresting
officer.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the decision of the trial court
affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts as presented by appellant paint a slanted and.
than clear picture of the total circumstances when appellant was
arrested.

Appellant attempts to show that he satisfied the statu:

by lighting the green light.

A more careful viewing of the facts

will actually show though that appellant did refuse to submit to,
test pursuant to the statute and this Court's standards.
Upon being arrested and being instructed that he must
take the breathalyzer test or lose his license for a year, the
appellant initially refused to take the test.

(R. 22, 23.)

It

was only until after a telephone conversation that appellant had•.
his attorney that he finnaly submitted in part to the testing
procedure.

(R.

23, 24.)

Once the appellant placed the mouthpiece of the breathal1.
into his mouth, the record shows that he was pretending to be
blowing, that he put his tongue over the hole of the mouthpiece
and produced only short puffs, and that all the while the appellar.:
kept faking blowing into the machine.
officer's instructions.

The events as they transpired are explaine:

by the arresting officer on Direct.
A.

He refused to follow the

(R.

25-27.)

Officer Curtis instructed Mr. Powell that what he

had to do, he brought the hose out, showed up the mouthpiece,
said what he needed to do was give him a deep lung air sample·

Q.

Are those his exact words?

A.

To the best of my know 1 e d ge, yes.

He said that

a ir sample."
frequently the word, "deep air sample, deep lung
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

j

Q.

Did he demonstrate where that air was to come from?

A.

I could not recall.

During the test he placed his

hands on his back in an effort to kind of indicate that he had
to squeeze out some air.

But I cannot recall any other gesture.

Q.

Okay.

Did you see Mr. Powell blow into the machine?

A.

I saw him look like he was going to blow into the

machine.
Q.

What did he do?

Describe his physical action.

A.

He placed the mouthpiece in his mouth and kind-a

made a move like he was blowing, like that.

(Indicating)

But het [yet] I heard no air going through the hose.
Q.

Did he purse up his lips?

A.

Yes, somewhat.

I assume you mean by that kind of

blow them out like there was air in there.
Q.

Okay.

The first time that he made that agreement did

the green light go on?

A.

No, it did not.

Q.

Did Officer Curtis give any explanation about that

light or what it meant or did not mean?

A.

No, he did not.

He just says basically he wanted

him to blow the green light out, which is just a little inspiration.

And then we wanted him just to blow in there as far as

~can, and we indicated that to him.
Q.

Did he explain to him how hard he needed to blow in

order to give him the deep air sample that he requested?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A.

More or less.

deep air sample.
tongue off it.

He kept saying, "We've got to have a

We've got to blow hard into it.
Just blow free into the machine.

Ta k e yo.!::.
Blow down

until it feels deep."

Q.

Did he ever do that?

A.

No, he did not.

Q.

Okay.

After the first time, you described him blowr

the first time, did he attempt a second time?
A.

Yes, he did.

To my memory, it was several times.

Officer Mel Curtis and the rest of us kept urging him to blow
in the machine, telling him to take his tongue off it.
he kept making with this action.

And

Finally I did hear a small

amount of air go in there, and the green light did come in.
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:
Q.

This green light did come on?
Yes, it did.

(By Mr. Hale)

Okay. After that light went on, did

Officer Curtis administering the test ask for another

breath

sample with more air?
A.

Yes, he did.

Q.

What did he say to Mr. Powell?

A.

Said, "You haven't given us a deep lung sample._

YOU

made the light go on, but we need more than.
harder."

Keep blowinq

Some words to that effect.
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Q.

What did Mr. Powell say to that?

A.

He stalled around there for several minutes.

Kept

telling him that that would be a refusal if he did not give
us a deep lung sample.
Did he subsequently blow into it again as he was

Q.

requested?
A.

was on.

No, he did not.

He kept saying, "The green light

That's all I have to do."

Q.

Okay.

Who was holding the end of the hose?

A.

He was.

Q.

After the several minutes had ensued and

·

t~ese

conversations that you talked about, then what happened?
A.

enough.

I cannot recall exactly how he indicated that was
I recall him fling or doing something with the end of

the hose and sitting down saying, "No, I will not take the
test."

I cannot recall his exact words, however.

(Emphasis

added.)
ARGUMENT
THE PEACE OFFICER DETERMINES HOW
A BREATHALYZER rs TO BE ADMINISTERED
AND IF A BREATH SAMPLE IS ADEQUATE
In regards to the "chemical testing" that is to be administered to suspected drunken drivers in the State of Utah, the
Pertinent parts of Utah Code Ann.

s

-5-

41-6-44.lO(a) state as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

" ••• A peace officer shall determine which of
the aforesaid tests shall be administered.
~o pers~n, who has been requested pursuant
to this se7tion to submit to a chemical test or
tests of his breath •.. shall have the right to
select the test or tests to be administered.

The failure or inability of a peace officer to
arrange for any specific test shall not be a
defense to taking a test requested by a peace
officer. • • • "
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 .10 (b) provides the following:
"If such a person has been placed under
arrest and has thereafter been requested by
a peace officer to submit to any one or more
of the chemical tests provided for in subsection (a) of this section and refuses to
submit to such chemical test or tests, such
person shall be warned by a peace officer
requesting the test or tests that a refusal
to submit to the test or tests can result in
revocation of his license to operate a motor
vehicle. Following this warning, unless such
person iitUnediately requests the chemical test
or tests as offered by a peace officer be
administered, no test shall be given • • . . "
The above statute explicitly provides peace officers with broad
and discretionary powers to administer "chemical tests" for
alcohol abuse.

Certainly such statute lends support to allow

officers certified and familiar with breathalyzer functions to
make independent judgments when administering tests.
What may seem proper and adequate to an arrestee may
be totally inadequate to a trained breathalyzer operator.
operator should be able to administer as many ~ as he deeJ11
reasonable and necessary under the circumstances.

5

Further,

in a case where there is an uncertainty, an inadvertent mistake,'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a misreading or even an error, an operator should be freely
allowed to readminister such tests until a fair sample is
obtained.
When it was determined in the case at hand that an
adequate and reasonable sampling of "breath" had not been
obtained, it was entirely proper for the peace officer to
request that appellant continue to exhale into the breathalyzer.
It was, and is, no defense for appellant to say that he supplied
the "required amount of breath to analyze" when in all reasonable..:
ness he should have been required to supply more.

All we are

saying here is that which has already been said by this.court in
the case of Moran v. Shaw, 580 P.2d. 241 1 243 (1978}, "The statute
plainly and simply requires that such an accused give his consent1
and it does not give him the privilege of imposing any conditions
as a prerequisite thereto", or as this court said in Beck v.'-Cox
597 P.2d. 1335, 1337 (1979), "The Implied .Consent Statute should

be construed in a fashion to make its application practicable and
to enable an officer to deal realistically with arrested drivers
who may be uncooperative, and even hostile."

This court went on

to say that the statute should not be construed to place a premium
on uncooperativeness and obstruction, which seems to be the exact
situation that was ruled upon by the trial court in this case.
On Page 1338 of the Beck decision, this court states that the
overwhelming weight of authority holds that a refusal may be
established on the basis of the conduct of the motorists, without
an ex9ress refusal.

The court goes on to suggest that the trial
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court should take an objective look at these circumstances,
·
Whk
is what the trial court did in this case; an d therefore his fine.
of refusal should be upheld.

Th e quo t a t'ions f rom the record she.

that the appellant was specifically instructed to give a deep a::
sample so that a fair test could be obtained.

He refused to do

that and also refused to follow the further instructions of the
officer, probably full well knowing that valid scientific inforu
tion was therefore not obtained.

POINT II
THE APPELLANT'S REFUSAL TO FOLLOW
THE OFFICER'S INSTRUCTION WAS A
REFUSAL
Appellant would have us believe that the acts he perfom

1

during the time when the breathalyzer was administered were
adequate.

The cold transcript shows that appellant, with little·

or no lung movement, merely puffed his cheeks out and blew out
the air contained in his mouth.

He pretended to be blowing,

while all the while his tongue was over the hole of the mouthpie~
If appellant had acted properly and as he was directed,
he would have completely inhaled and exhaled, causing his lungs
to contract and cause a gust of air to be exhaled from "down
deep."
An expert in the field of breathalyzers explains below

how a person is to blow into the machine and the problems that
are encountered if one does not do so properly.

I
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A fresh mouth piece, or saliva trap, is then
attached to the heated Sample Tube and the
subject is instructed on how the sample is
to be delivered. The subject should be told
to blow as long as possible in order to be
sure that the sample is from the deep lung
area of the subject and thus an Alveolar air
sample. Regardless of the amount of air blown
into the machine, the vent system disposes of
all but the last section of the predetermined
sample chamber volume of 52.5 cc. If the
subject does not, or cannot, produce a deep lung
Alveolar air sample, and in reality only casses
mouth air into the machine, then a false reading
will be obtained, This reading may be falsely
high or low depending upon the contents of
, _
residual hydrocarbon material present in the
mouth of the subject at the time of the test.
(Emphasis added.)
Richard E. Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases, Third Edition,
Vol. 2 (1979),

§

22.02, p. 22-15.

Not only does the driver not have the prerogative to
impose conditions or qualifications, respondent submits that
only giving part of the test is no test at all.

This reasoning

is not inconsistent with the Beck decision of this court and
has been upheld in California.

In the following case, after the

driver was arrested and warned, he agreed to submit to a urine
test.

The officer's instructions were that a second sample would

be required thirty minutes later.

The driver was unable to give

the second sample and his license revocation refusal was upheld
by the California court.
"Certainly, by agreeing to one type of test,
and then voluntarily or involuntarily, failing
to submit to it, a driver may not thereby deny

-9-
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to thet dstate
its right to any test ····rivers
D ·
f
arre~ e
or oper~ting a vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor could
merely thwart the law by giving a par~
balloon test, a partial blood sample or
here
· d equate specimen of urine.
'
' as
. . 'an ina
The
giving of a.partial urine sample did not satisfy the requirements of the law. The statute
contemplates that a partial test is not an entire
test."
(Emphasis added.)
Cahall v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 94 Cal. Rptr. 182, 185
(Cal. App.-1971).
What the appellant tries to do here is elevate form to
substance which was not allowed by this court "to elevate fom
to substance" in the case of Elliott v. Darius, 557 P.2d. 759
(1976)

(page 761, paragraph 2), as expressed by Judge Maughn in

that opinion.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF
A REFUSAL IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD
NOT BE REVERSED.
This court, in Gassman v. Darius, 557 P.2d. 197 (1975),
said that"Each case is based on its own facts and we do not rever:
the trial judge unless he clearly does violence to the facts as
they relate to his findings."

Of course, this court has consiste:

ly upheld that simple rule of law and it has been reiterated.
For example, in Beck, Id. at 1337, Judge Stewart said,
"Since the findings of the trial court are supported by substanti.
h
t b
ff· rm d
competent evidence, t ey mus
e a i
e .

Charleton v. Hacke!!.'
-----
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l

11 utah 2d, 389, 360 P.2d. 176 (1961); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah
2d, 133, 369 p. 2d. 290 (1962). ti
Applying the well-reasoned law to a complete reading
of the transcript shows that there were substantial and uncontradieted facts showing that the trial judge's findings were correct
and should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
The findings of the trial judge should be upheld as they
are consisted with the evidence presented.

The appellant did

refuse by failing to comply with the totality of the officer's
instructions and such a finding by the trial court was proper
under the circumstances and should be upheld.
DATED this 13th day of December, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Atto~al

~~~~
BRUCE M. HALE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief
to Robert M. McRae, Attorney for Appellant, of McRae

&

DeLand,

at 319 West First South, Suite A, Vernal, Utah 84078, on this
13th day of December, 1979.
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